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INCOME TAX-NoMINEE REAL ESTATE CoRpoP0 TIoN HELD
TAXABLE DESPITE TRIAL CouRT FINDING THAT THE CORPORATION
WAS AN AGENT
Taxpayers created a corporation to hold title to land they had re-
cently purchased and received capital stock in proportion to their re-
spective interests in the property. A corporate resolution stated that the
purpose of the corporation was to hold title for the use and benefit of
the taxpayers in order to facilitate the payment of ad valorem and drainage
district taxes and to expedite contemplated conveyances. Subsequently,
the corporation sold timber from the land and deposited the receipts in the
corporate bank account. This money, together with paid-in capital 2 con-
tributed by the taxpayers to the corporation, was used to pay taxes and
drainage assessments. Thereafter, in separate transactions,3 the corpora-
tion sold most of the land, deposited the proceeds in its own bank account,
and executed assignments, satisfactions, and partial releases of mortgages,
which were obtained when the sales were made.4 The proceeds were dis-
bursed to pay expenses and taxes, and the balance was distributed pro-
portionately to the beneficial owners who reported the income as their
own. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue asserted that the income
was taxable to the corporation, and assessed deficiencies against the tax-
payers as transferees thereof. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
disregarded the findings of the district court that the corporation was
' The purchase took place in 1946, and the corporation issued forty shares of
capital stock at $25 per share. Each of the three married parties and his wife took
a one-eighth interest in the land. An unmarried party took a one-fourth interest,
but withdrew from the corporation in 1947.
2 The capital was advanced by one of the taxpayers, who was subsequently
reimbursed by the others in proportion to their respective interests. Miles v.
Tomlinson, 61-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 81207, 81209 (S.D. Fla. 1961), rev'd, 316 F.2d 710
(5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 3138 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1963).
3The transactions occurred between 1948 and 1953. In one of them, the cor-
poration repurchased a tract of land that it had previously sold. The profit from
the sale was 1325%, based upon receipts of $162,491.72, expenses of $20,394.67, and the
initial capital of $10,000.
4 The corporation did not develop, lease, subdivide, mortgage, or use the land
at any time. It had no office or manager, paid no salaries, engaged in no transactions
not related to the land, and did not borrow any money.
5 See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 13(b), as amended, ch. 994, § 121(a), 64 Stat.
914 (1950), as amended (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 11(a)), which levies a
tax on corporations; Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 15(b), added by ch. 419, § 201, 54
Stat. 520 (1940), as amended, ch. 521, § 121(f), 65 Stat. 468 (1951) (now INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, §11(c)), which levies a surtax on corporations; Int. Rev.
Code of 1939, § 22(a), as amended, ch. 59, §§ 1, 3 (1939) (now INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 61 (a)), which sets forth the principles determining income.
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either a trustee holding mere record title 6 or an agent of the shareholders.
The court held that income was taxable to the corporation because it en-
gaged in business activity. Tomlinson v. Miles, 316 F.2d 710 (5th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 3138 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1963), reversing
61-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 81207 (S.D. Fla. 1961).
In Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner,7 the Supreme Court im-
plied that under limited circumstances a corporation might be considered
a mere agent, with its income taxable directly to the owner-principal. 8
Moline Properties concerned a corporation created by the petitioner, at
the demand of a creditor, to hold legal title to realty. The corporate stock
was placed in a voting trust controlled by the creditor for the duration
of the loan. The Supreme Court held the corporation taxable on income
resulting from sales of property that occurred after the petitioner had re-
gained control of the corporation, despite the petitioner's contention that
the corporation was either his alter ego or his agent. The Court stated
that the separation of the corporation from the petitioner when the stock
was in the voting trust and the corporation's involvement in an un-
ambiguous business venture-the leasing of part of the land as a parking
lot-indicated that the corporation was not an alter ego.9  Moreover, the
Court did not seriously consider the contention that the corporation was
the agent of the sole shareholder since there was "no actual contract of
agency, nor the usual incidents of an agency relationship."1 LO
The agency rationale was later elaborated in National Carbide Corp.
v. Commissioner," in which the alleged "agent" was a subsidiary that
owned assets worth almost twenty million dollars, supplied the labor with
which the income was earned, and had net earnings of over four million
dollars in one taxable year. Holding the subsidiary taxable, the Court
stated that when a corporation carries on business activity it is not an
agent merely because the owner directs its affairs, provides all its assets,
and is entitled by contract to all its profits.12 However, the Court agreed
that, although a corporation is generally taxable if it engages in business
activity, a true corporate agent may handle the property and income of its
owner-principal without taxation.13 The Court explained that some of
the considerations determining the existence of a true corporate agent are
6 The tests governing the taxability of the nominee corporate trustee are unclear.
Dictum in National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422, 439 (1949), indi-
cates that the nominee trustee is not taxable. Apparently only one other recent case
has dealt with the trustee theory. See Caswal Corp., 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 757
(1960), in which the Tax Court held a corporation nontaxable because it performed
the same functions as a trustee. However, the court also held that Caswal Cor-
poration was nontaxable since it had not engaged in business activity. Id. at 763.
7 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
8Id. at 440 (senzble).
9 Id. at 440.
10 Ibid.
11336 U.S. 422 (1949).
12 Id. at 432, 435-36.
13 Id. at 426-27, 437.
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whether the corporation operates in the name and for the account
of the principal, binds the principal by its actions, transmits
money received to the principal, and whether receipt of income is
attributable to the services of employees of the principal and to
assets belonging to the principal . . . .4
For a corporation to be categorized as an agent, therefore, its business pur-
pose must be to carry on the "normal duties of an agent." 15
There are substantial reasons for finding an agency relationship be-
tween beneficial owners of land and nominee real estate corporations.
Owners of property have frequently used agents both to hold title and to
sell realty. Combining both these functions in a corporate rather than an
individual agent ' 6 should not produce a different tax result, especially
since a tax avoidance motive is not likely to be present, and the "normal
duties" of the agent are clear.17 The owners of the land seek to use the
corporate form to expedite conveyances without incurring an additional
tax, not to avoid taxes previously applicable. In addition, the nominee
corporation deals with assets equitably owned by others, not by itself-a
factor which distinguishes it from a normal corporation. Finally, the
nominee real estate corporation has traditionally been treated as an excep-
tion for tax purposes.'8
The Tax Court has taxed income arising from land transactions to
the beneficial owners, rather than the nominee corporation, when the
beneficial owners are not the stockholders of the corporation. 19 In these
cases the nominee corporations cannot act solely at the direction of the
14Id. at 437.
15Ibid. The National Carbide and Moline Properties standards reflect a line
of earlier cases which held that a nominee was nontaxable if beneficial title to the
land were in the shareholders and the corporation acted as a mere trustee, see Abrams
Sons' Realty Corp., 40 B.T.A. 653, 655 (1939); cf. Thrift Realty Co., 29 B.T.A.
545, 550 (1933), acq., XIII-1 Cum. BULL 16 (1934), if the corporation held legal
title to the realty and served as a conduit for the income from the property to the
beneficial owners of the land, 112 W. 59th St. Corp. v. Helvering, 68 F.2d 397, 398
(D.C. Cir. 1933); Moro Realty Holding Corp., 25 B.T.A. 1135, 1146 (1932), aff'd
per curiam, 65 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1933), acq., 1947-1 Cum. BuLL. 3, or if both legal
and beneficial title were in the stockholders, Stewart Forshay, 20 B.T.A. 537, 549
(1930), nonacq., X-1 Cum. BULL 79 (1931). In Forshay, which is similar to the
present factual situation, the corporation was created to hold legal title to certain
realty for the use and benefit of the stockholders, and was given power to sell,
mortgage, and convey the property. The corporation eventually conveyed the prop-
erty as a result of a sale negotiated by the stockholders. The Board of Tax Appeals,
relying on the finding that the stockholders held both legal and equitable title, found
that the corporation was not taxable. Id. at 549.
16See Edwin B. Michael, 16 B.T.A. 1365 (1929) (by implication), holding
the true owner and not the individual agent taxable on income from property held
by the latter.
37 Compare text accompanying note 15 supra.
18 See Comment, 29 TEXAS L. REv. 87, 97 (1950), discussing this exception under
the entity test.
19 See, e.g., K-C Land Co., 19 CCH Tax Ct Mene. 183, 186-87 (1960); cf.
Worth S.S. Corp., 7 T.C. 654, 664-65 (1946). K-C Lard Co., however, was based
on the lack of business activity rather than the presence of an agency relationship.
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shareholders but only through agreements with the beneficial owners.
These agreements, which should be formally expressed, 20 emphasize the
nominee corporation's agency status when they provide that the corpora-
tion be paid an agent's fee for its services. Then the stockholders have a
separate interest in the corporation, and their dividends are derived from the
corporation's agency fee, not from total gains on sales.
Although the separation of beneficial ownership of the land from the
stockholders seems to create a clearer agency than does the present case,21
the district court's finding of agency seems correct. The corporation was
not created as a tax avoidance device; 2 its primary function was to hold
and convey title to real estate; its income was derived from assets which
the trial court found belonged both legally and equitably to the beneficial
owners under Florida law; 2 3 the corporation could act only at the direc-
tion of the beneficial owners with respect to conveyances, thus binding
the owners to its acts; and receipts, less expenses, were ultimately trans-
mitted to the owners. In addition, the district court found that the owner-
ship of the individuals was "open and notorious, was disclosed to pur-
chasers or known to them, and was not kept a secret." 2 4 This, in effect,
represents a finding that the corporation acted in the name of the prin-
cipals. Moreover, the taxpayers attempted to demonstrate such an agency
in the corporate resolution.
The present court erred when it failed to consider the agency
question. However, if the corporation were not an agent, the holding of
taxability might be justified. Corporations that do not meet the agency
exception cannot escape taxation2 5 if created to conduct a business,2 or
20 See Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 440 (1943), for
the suggestion that an agency contract may be required.
2 1 The Supreme Court has noted that when the stockholders are different
persons from those holding beneficial ownership, the corporation is more clearly a
separate taxable entity. Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 440
(1943). Under the agency analysis, however, this situation argues against taxation.
22The Commissioner did not contend that the present corporation was created
as a scheme to avoid taxation. Brief for Appellee, p. 53.
2 3 Miles v. Tomlinson, 61-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 81207, 81211 (S.D. Fla. 1961), reed,
316 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 3138 (U.S. Oct. 14,
1963) (No. 286).
24Id. at 81210.
2 Subchapter S of the INT. RFv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1371-77, presents an alternative
way to avoid corporate taxation. It provides that certain small business corporations
may elect to be taxed in a manner similar to a partnership. Under § 1372(e) (5),
this election to be so taxed terminates if more than twenty percent of the corpqra-
tion's gross receipts are derived from rents, dividends, interest, or sales and ex-
changes of stocks and securities. This provision would bar many nominees from a
subchapter S election, however, since their gross receipts are often composed entirely
of rents in a given taxable year. See, e.g., Moro Realty Holding Corp., 25 B.T.A.
1135 (1932).
26 A corporation is taxed when the creator's purpose "is the equivalent of busi-
ness activity." Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 439 (1943).
The application of this business purpose test to nominees is unclear; only two cases
have been found that dealt with it. See Gregg Co. v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d
498, 502 (2d Cir. 1956) (alternative holding), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 946 (1957);
Garden State Developers, Inc., 30 T.C. 135, 140 (1958) (alternative holding), acq.,
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if they actually engaged in business activity.27 Business activity has been
defined to require more than holding title to the land and conveying it 2
or transmitting its income, such as rents, to the beneficial owners." A
minimal amount of other business activity by the nominee such as the
renting of part of the land for a parking lot,30 or the negotiating and
obtaining of a loan on the property 3l will result in its taxation. There-
fore, in the absence of an agency relationship, the present holding might
be supported on the narrow ground that the sale of timber from the land
constituted business activity, although a similar sale has been held by the
Tax Court not to be business activity.3 2 Nevertheless, the present court
also enumerated as business activity many functions connected with hold-
ing and conveying the land, such as the recording of title and the negotia-
tion of contracts of sale, which have heretofore been treated as beyond
1959-1 Cuit. BULL. 4. Both of these cases, moreover, may be explained as business
activity cases. Compare text accompanying note 27 infra.
In cases decided prior to Moline Properties, it had been established that the
election to do business as a corporation normally requires the acceptance of tax
disadvantages. E.g., Burnet v. Commonwealth Improvement Co., 287 U.S. 415
(1932); cf. Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 477 (1940) (dictum). After Higginm,
the Commissioner contended that the taxpayer could never assert the nontaxability
of a corporation which he had created, but that the Commissioner could do so
to effectuate the purposes of the tax statute. See United States v. Brager Bldg. &
Land Corp., 124 F.2d 349, 351 (4th Cir. 1941) (reference by court to Commissioner's
brief). The contention that the taxpayer could never deny taxability was rejected.
Id. at 351, see Jackson v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1956), acq., 1955-2
Cum. BULL. 7. See also Commissioner v. State-Adams Corp., 283 F.2d 395 (2d Cir.
1960).
2 7 Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra note 26, at 439.
28 See, e.g., K-C Land Co., 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 183, 187 (1960); John A.
Mulligan, 16 T.C. 1489, 1492 (1951), nonacq., 1951-2 Cum. BU=. 5.
29 See, e.g., Paymer v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1945), in which
one nominee was held nontaxable on such collections. However, a second nominee
was held taxable on similar rents because it also obtained a loan on the property.
Compare Commissioner v. State-Adams Corp., 283 F.2d 395, 398 (2d Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 844 (1961), in which the court distinguished Paymer because
State-Adams was able to act without the consent of the beneficial owners and the
income belonged to the corporation, unlike Paymer which represented "a restate-
ment of the fundamental rule that income from real estate held in the name of a
nominee will be taxed to the beneficial owner, not to the nominee," with cases cited
supra note 19. See generally Polisher, The Income Tax Status of the Agency
Corporation, 21 TAXES 652 (1943).
30 Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 440 (1943).
31Paymer v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 334, 336-37 (2d Cir. 1945). However, a
corporation is not taxable on income earned by the business activity of another person
conducted on the corporation's property. See Bartell Hotel Co., 32 T.C. 311
(1959), acq., 1959-2 Cum. BULL. 3, in which one corporation owned the hotel, but
a second corporation operated it. The income from the operation was held taxable
only to the operating company and not to the title-holding company.
32K-C Land Co., 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 183, 187 (1960). The court held
that the corporation had not engaged in business activity even though it maintained
a corporate bank account, assumed a mortgage on one parcel of land, cut and sold
timber from the land, sold a parcel of land, acquired an assignment of an oil and
gas lease, acquired common stocks, and finally sold the balance of the land.
1963]
290 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.112
the pale of the business activity test.33 The court's broad concept of
business activity seems unwise because the usefulness of "straw" cor-
porations depends largely on their ability to convey land.
TRUSTS-PrNCePAL AND INCOME ACT CONSTRUE To ALLow
AI 4 0oATIoN OF SMALL STOCK DIVIDENDS TO INCOME
In 1932, settlor placed 20,000 shares of Sun Oil Company common
stock in trust to pay the net income to the life tenant with gifts over. In
December 1961, the trustees received a six percent common stock dividend
from Sun Oil Company which the lower court allocated to principal. This
determination was reversed on appeal. Pew Trust, 411 Pa. 96, 191 A.2d
399 (1963).
In 1857 the Pennsylvania courts first announced the so-called Penn-
sylvania Rule of Apportionment 1 to govern the allocation of corporate
distributions between income beneficiary and remainderman. 2 The Rule
focused on the source of each dividend, allocating to the income beneficiary
only those distributions from earnings accumulated by the corporation
subsequent to the execution of the trust.3 In accordance with the policy
of the Rule, ordinary cash dividends were assigned in toto to the income
beneficiary,4 and almost invariably small stock dividends would also go to
the income beneficiary.5 Only recently, however, have cases concerning
small stock dividends come before the courts.
6
3 The court lists these functions as:
the acquisition and recording of title to the land in question, the surveying
of the land, the paying of taxes on it, the searching of titles, the sale of
timber from it, the negotiations of contracts for its sale in different parcels,
its actual sale, its receipt of purchase money security deeds, its release of
these security deeds and its satisfaction of these deeds of record, . . . the
reacquisition of a tract of land from one purchaser, [and] the acquisition of
an additional tract in order to clear title ....
Instant case at 714.
1 Hereinafter referred to as the Rule.
2 Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368 (1857).
2 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 847 (2d ed. 1962); 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS §§ 236.3,
236.6 (2d ed. 1956). See generally Brigham, Pennsylvania Rides Governing the
Allocation of Receipts Derived by Trustees From Shares of Stock, 85 U. PA. L. REv.
358 (1937); Cohan & Dean, Legal, Tax and Accounting Aspects of Fiduciary
Apportionment of Stock Proceeds: The Non-Statutory Pennsylvania Rules, 106
U. PA. L. REv. 157 (1957).
4 Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368, 374 (1857); BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 843
(2d ed. 1962); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), TRUSTS § 236 (1959); 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS
§ 236.1 (2d ed. 1956).
5 The Pennsylvania Rule of Apportionment protects only the "intact value" of
the corpus-its value at the time the trust was executed. Since small stock dividends
are most frequently distributed from current earnings of the corporation, the likeli-
hood that their allocation to income would impair intact value is remote.
6 The problem was discussed for the first time in Pennsylvania in Cunningham
Estate, 395 Pa. 1, 34, 149 A.2d 72, 89 (1959) (separate opinion) where it was stated
that small stock dividends of six percent or less automatically go to income. This
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With the increasing complexity of corporate distributions, the Rule
became concomitantly more difficult to administer.7  To reduce the trus-
tee's burdens, the Pennsylvania legislature adopted the Uniform Principal
and Income Act 8 which focuses on the form of the distribution, allocating
all cash dividends to income and all stock dividends to corpus.9 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had held unconstitutional 10 the provision
making the act applicable to distributions from trusts executed before its
passage," but the court reversed itself in Catherwood Trust,'2 ruling that
no vested property rights were affected by retroactive application of the
act.13 In the present case, however, the court interpreted the Principal
and Income Act -to assign small stock dividends of six percent or less to
the income beneficiary. 14
rule was first applied in Pennsylvania in Catherwood Trust, 405 Pa. 61, 173 A.2d
86 (1961).
In In the Matter of Estate of Villard, 147 Misc. 472, 264 N.Y. Supp. 236
(Surr. Ct. 1933), a decision remarkably similar to that in the instant case, the
court held that despite a statute providing for allocation of all stock dividends
to principal, ordinary stock dividends must nevertheless go to income under the
Pennsylvania Rule of Apportionment in force in New York prior to the act. While
this interpretation of the act was later repudiated in In the Matter of Estate of
Ryan, 294 N.Y. 85, 60 N.E.2d 817 (1945), no suggestion was made that ordinary
stock dividends wouia not go to income if the Pennsylvania Rule of Apportionment
had not been superseded by the act.
In Vermont, however, the court decided in In re Estate of Valiquette, 122 Vt.
350, 173 A.2d 832 (1961), that stock dividends issued more or less regularly by East-
man Kodak Co. must be apportioned under the Pennsylvania Rule.
7 For recent criticism of the Rule of Apportionment see Cunningham Estate, 395
Pa. 1, 11, 149 A.2d 72, 78 (1959) ; Catherood Estate, 22 Pa. D. & C.2d 701, 704-06
(Orphans' Ct 1960), modified, 405 Pa. 61, 173 A.2d 86 (1961) ; Flickinger, A Trus-
tee's Nightmare: Allocation of Stock Dividends Between Income and Principal, 43
B.U.L. Ray. 199, 211-29 (1963) ; Niles, Fosdick, Cunningham and Chaos, 98 TRuSTS
& ESTATES 924 (1959).
8 PA. STAT. ANN. tit 20, § 3470.1 to .15 (Supp. 1962).
9 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3470.5 (Supp. 1962) provides:
(1) All dividends on shares of a corporation, forming a part of the principal,
which are payable in the shares of the corporation itself of the same kind and
rank as the shares on which such dividend is paid shall be deemed principal.
Subject to the provisions of this section, all dividends payable otherwise
than in such shares of the corporation itself, including ordinary and extra-
ordinary dividends . . . shall be deemed income.
' Crawford Estate, 362 Pa. 458, 67 A.2d 124 (1949).
11 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3470.15 (Supp. 1962) :
The provisions of this act shall become effective upon the enactment
thereof, and shall apply to all estates of tenants or remaindermen and to all
wills, trust agreements and trust relations theretofore or thereafter made -or
created.
Significantly, the Uniform Principal and Income Act, the model for the Pennsylvania
statute, provided only for prospective application. See UxiFORm PRINCIPAL AND
INCOmE AcT § 17.
12405 Pa. 61, 173 A.2d 86 (1961).
13 Without explanation, the court made its ruling in futuro so that the small
stock dividends in that case were distributed to income. However, the court explicitly
stated in a footnote, 405 Pa. at 78, 173 A.2d at 94, that in the future the allocation
of small stock dividends of six percent or less would be governed by the Principal
and Income Act.
14Justices Jones and Cohen dissented on the ground that the Catherwood de-
cision, unless overruled, must govern. Mr. Justice Cohen expressed the opinion that
19631
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Those who oppose this "six percent rule" 15 assert that a trustee must
be treated like any other stockholder. They argue that stock dividend
allocation should be compatible with the principles of corporate law defining
the corporation-stockholder relationship, the nature of corporate stock, and
the nature of stock dividends. 16 Under this theory it is fundamental that
earnings belong entirely -to -the corporation until severed from corporate
assets and distributed to the trustee.17 Accordingly, a small stock dividend
should not be equated with an ordinary cash dividend since its declaration
is reflected on the corporate books only by an entry transferring assets from
surplus to capital; the newly issued shares, along with the old shares,
represent the same corporate assets formerly represented by the old shares
alone. Since the income beneficiary is entitled to nothing when the old
shares alone represent increased corporate worth, the mere issuance of new
indicia of ownership should not change those rights.18
Proponents of the six percent rule argue that principles designed to
govern the rights and obligations between corporation and shareholder
should not control the income beneficiary-remainderman relationship.19
If, for instance, all stock dividends were allocated to principal, the trustee
the retroactive application of the Principal and Income Act neither violated the due
process clause nor interferred with the obligation of contracts.
The court has twice avoided an appeal to the United States Supreme Court on
the constitutionality of retroactive application of the Principal and Income Act, first
by making its ruling in futuro in Catherwood and now by basing its decision in the
instant case on the old court-made rules of allocation. Fear that the Supreme Court
would find retroactive application of the act unconstitutional appears unwarranted.
See In re Trust for Gardner, 123 N.W.2d 69 (Minn. 1963) ; Will of Allis, 6 Wis.
2d 1, 94 N.W.2d 226 (1959). See generally Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Con-
stitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 Hav. L. REV. 692 (1960) ; King, Uniform
Principal and Income Act, § 5: Constitutionality of Its Retroactive Application, 1960
WASH. U.L.Q. 339; Niles, supra note 7, at 927-28; 73 HAxv. L. REv. 605 (1960).
15 This discussion will not deal with the correctness of six percent as opposed to
some other figure. But cf. Ky. Acts 1960, ch. 155, which declared that any dividend un-
der ten percent should go to income. This provision was later repealed. Ky. Acts 1962,
ch. 133. The Uniform Principal and Income Act now controls the allocation of
corporate distributions in that state. Ky. REv. STAT. 386.190 to .340 (1962).
At the other end of the spectrum is the provision of the Revised Uniform Prin-
cipal and Income Act that a stock dividend shall be income if the directors declare
it to be in lieu of a cash dividend. See Bogert, Uniform Principal and Income Act
Revised, 101 TRUSTS & ESTATES 787 (1962).
16 Hayes v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 317 Mo. 1028, 1046, 298 S.W. 91, 98
(1927).
17 See 11 FLETCHER, CYcLOPEIA CoRpoRATioNs § 5321 (rev. ed. 1958).
I8 Opponents of the six percent rule adopt what is essentially the Massachusetts
Rule which the Uniform Principal and Income Act drafters copied in allocating stock
dividends to principal and cash dividends to income. For more extended explanations
of this rationale see Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101 (1868) ; Gibbons v. Mahon, 136
U.S. 549 (1890) ; Hayes v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 317 Mo. 1028, 298 S.W. 91
(1927); Armentrout v. Armentrout, 63 Ohio L. Abs. 186, 100 N.E.2d 555 (P. Ct.
1951) ; Flickinger, supra note 7, at 202-08; Isaacs, Principal-Quantum or Res?, 46
HARv. L. :Rv. 776 (1933).
While the Uniform Act drafters copied the Massachusetts Rule for its advantage
of expediency, it does not necessarily follow that the states which enacted it thereby
adopted for all purposes the rationale behind it.
19 See In re Trust for Gardner, 123 N.W.2d 69, 74 (Minn. 1963) ; BOGERT, TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES § 845, at 491 (2d ed. 1962) ; Cohan, Accounting Considerations of
Apportionment by Trustees of Receipts From Stock, 36 Taar. L.Q. 121, 128-29 (1963).
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would violate his fiduciary duty of impartiality between income beneficiary
and remainderman if he retained stock in a corporation which mainly
distributed small stock dividends in lieu of cash. Such favoritism for the
remainderman 20 could not be tolerated, and, despite the soundness of the
investment, the trustee would be forced to reinvest in securities which paid
cash dividends.2 '
If the respective interests of life tenant and remainderman are stressed,
rather than formal concepts of corpus, it seems that the six percent rule
provides the life tenant with an adequate income while any undistributed
earnings 22 will enhance the value of the corpus and protect the remainder-
man against diminution of its purchasing power.23 Expedient trust admin-
istration is preserved 24 along with a more equitable allocation of distribu-
tions and a better approximation of what would have been the settlor's
intent,25 at least in instances such as the present case in which the settlor
was aware of .the company's policy of regularly issuing small stock dividends
in lieu of cash. It is unlikely that the present settlor intended that the
trustees sell the stock of this family-based 2 6 corporation in order to assure
a better return to the income beneficiary.
Another source of hostility to the six percent rule is the fear that if
small stock dividends were allocated to income, the Internal Revenue Serv-
20 It has been suggested, however, that if the trust portfolio is looked at as a
whole, the trustees could then manage it so that stocks with low yield to the income
beneficiary would be compensated for by other investments distributing a high cash
return. Dunham, Scott & Wolf, Uniform Revised Principal and Income Act, 101
TRuSTS & ESTATES 894, 895-96 (1962) ; Niles, The New 6% Stock Distribution Rile,
102 TRusTs & ESTATES 648, 708 (1963).
21 See Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Tucker, 52 R.I. 277, 160 AtI. 465 (1932).
22 "Distribute, is used here in the sense of a distribution by the corporation to
the trustee of cash or small stock dividends.
23 Protection of the purchasing power of corpus corrects one of the glaring inade-
quacies of the Pennsylvania Rule of Apportionment. That Rule was concerned with
merely maintaining the dollar value of the corpus as of the time of its creation. See
authorities cited note 3 supra. This approach embodies two anachronistic concepts,
the first being that the dollar value will correspond with purchasing power when
final distribution is made. This assumption is not true in an inflationary economy.
The second is that the settlor was primarily interested in the income beneficiary.
This assumption has been subjected to a critical second look. See 3 Scott, TRusTs
§ 236.3, at 1820 (2d ed. 1956).; Niles, supra note 20, at 650, 708.
24 The one great advantage of the Massachusetts Rule was its simplicity and ease
of application. It was mainly for this reason that it was adopted in the Uniform Act.
However, the six percent rule would appear to allow equally felicitous trust ad-
ministration. But see Dunham, Scott & Wolf, supra note 20, at 894.
25The court-made or statutory rules of allocation are applied in the absence of
instructions expressing the intent of the settlor. See 3 ScoTt, TRuSTs § 236.3, at 1819
(2d ed. 1956). The provision by settlor that "income" shall go to life tenant does
not constitute a manifestation of intention by settlor as to the distribution of stock
dividends. Flickinger, supra note 7, at 230 n.94. See also King, supra note 14, at
352-53. It is likely that settlor never considered the allocation problem so that the
only intent that can be imputed to him is that he would desire a rule which is fair
and just to both remainderman and the income beneficiary and which does not impose
immense administrative problems in the light of present day conditions. See In re
Trust for Gardner, 123 N.W.2d 69, 73 (Minn. 1963); 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 236.3, at
1819-20 (2d ed. 1956). This approach recognizes that the fundamental principle behind
a rule of allocation should be impartiality. See Dunham, A Trustee's Dilemma as to
Principal and Income, 26 U. CmI. L. Rxv. 405, 408 (1959).
26 See instant case at 108, 191 A.2d at 406.
1963]
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ice would thereby have cause to urge, contrary to present law,27 that such
dividends constitute taxable income.28  This fear does not seem well
founded, however,29 since the nature of a stock dividend is not changed
by its allocation to the income beneficiary.30
Despite the advantages of the six percent rule as a matter of policy,
the court's disregard in the present case for statutory language and legis-
lative intent was unjustifiable. A provision of the Principal and Income
Act specifies that the settlor's "direction" as to allocation of principal and
income will prevail over any contrary provision of the act.3 1 In determin-
ing what constitutes settlor's "direction," the court stated that since pre-
1945 settlors cannot be expected to have carefully articulated their wishes
to satisfy a statute not then in existence, settlor's intention at the time he
executed the trust meets the requirements of the act. The court further
stated that since it was clear in 1932 that income included ordinary cash
and stock dividends of six percent or less,3 2 it must have been settlor's
intention to incorporate that rule into the trust instrument.3 3 Thus, while
purporting to implement the Principal and Income Act as a whole, the
court's equation of the then prevailing law with a "direction" of the settlor
emasculates the retroactivity provision.3 4
Also, by approving Catherwood in the present case while employing
a rationale directly opposed to that decision, the court has left a trustee in
the awkward position of not knowing whether to apply the old court-made
rules or the Principal and Income Act to extraordinary distributions from
pre-1945 trusts. The court stated that the Catherwood decision was not
2 7 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 305; cf. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
23 See Dunham, Scott & Wolf, supra note 20, at 894-95.
2 See Equitable Trust Co. v. Prentice, 250 N.Y. 1, 11-12, 164 N.E. 723, 725
(1928) ; BOGERT, TRusTs AND TRUSTEES § 845, at 491 (2d ed. 1962) ; 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS
§ 236.3, at 1818-19 (2d ed. 1956) ; Isaacs, supra note 18, at 787-88.30 This conclusion does not contradict the fact that characterization of the nature
of an interest by state law often determines the interest to be taxed under federal
law. See Strite v. McGinnes, 215 F. Supp. 513, 515 (E.D. Pa. 1963), 112 U. PA. L.
Rxv. 141. The characterization in the present case would not affect the extent
of the property interest being conveyed but merely determine the party to whom it
shall be given.31 PA. STAT. AxN. tit. 20, § 3470.2 (Supp. 1962):
[T]he person establishing the principal may himself direct the manner of
ascertainment of income and principal and the apportionment of receipts and
expenses or grant discretion to the trustee, or other person, to do so and
such provision and direction, where not otherwise contrary to law, shall
control, notwithstanding this act.
32 It is questionable whether anyone really knew what should be done with small
stock dividends. The six percent rule was first enunciated by a member of the court
nearly thirty years after the creation of the trust in the instant case. See note 6 mrpra.
So doubtful was this rule that the lower court in Catherwood held that small stock
dividends had to be apportioned. Catherwood Estate, 22 Pa. D. & C.2d 701 (Orphans'
Ct 1960), modified, 405 Pa. 61, 173 A.2d 86 (1961).
33 But see Farmers Bank & Capital Trust Co. v. Hulette, 293 S.W.2d 458, 462
(Ky. 1956) ("we must presume the testatrix intended any legal difficulties of con-
struction arising under her will to be solved according to the prevailing legal principles
applicable to changed conditions"); accord, Will of Allis, 6 Wis. 2d 1, 94 N.W.2d 226
(1959).
34 PA. STAT. AN. tit 20, § 3470.15 (Supp. 1962).
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meant to apply to small stock dividends of six percent or less 35 or, if it did,
it was overruled to that extent.38 This necessarily implies that while the
beneficiaries have no vested interest in the Pennsylvania Rule of Appor-
tionment, they do have a vested interest in the six percent rule, since the
only basis for avoiding the statutory mandate that the act be applied retro-
actively is to hold the retroactive application unconstitutional.37  However,
this distinction is not warranted because the six percent rule is itself only
an equitable rule of apportionment. It is, in fact, part of the Pennsylvania
Rule of Apportionment in the sense that it constitutes part of that body
of court-made rules directing the allocation of corporate distributions. 8
Even if this distinction between the Pennsylvania Rule of Apportion-
ment and the six percent rule is preserved on the constitutional level, so
that the Principal and Income Act still applies retroactively with respect to
extraordinary dividends, the court's alternative holding regarding the six
percent rule as a "direction" of the settlor could just as easily apply to the
entire Pennsylvania Rule of Apportionment. This, in effect, would male
the allocation provisions of the Principal and Income Act inapplicable to
pre-1945 trusts receiving extraordinary dividends.
At the time the court delivered its decision in the present case, the
Pennsylvania legislature was considering an amendment to the Principal
and Income Act, which has since been enacted,39 incorporating the six
percent rule.40  However, a desire to give the income beneficiaries in the
35 It is difficult to believe that Catherwood did not apply to small stock dividends
since the footnote, see note 13 supra, was added to the opinion after initial release
and before printing in the reports, as a result of a further hearing. See Fiduciary
Rev., Oct. 1961, p. 4. In addition, Catherwood expressly adopted the rationale of
Will of Allis, 6 Wis. 2d 1, 94 N.W.2d 226 (1959), which found that the income
beneficiary had no vested interest in a two percent stock dividend so that the Wiscon-
sin Principal and Income Act determined its allocation.
36 Instant case at 103, 191 A.2d at 403.
37 In determining whether the Principal and Income Act can be applied
retroactively to trusts created prior to May 3, 1945, we must consider solely
the legality from a constitutional viewpoint of so doing: if no constitutional
barrier interposes to prevent such retroactive application, we must carry out
the legislative mandate which made the provisions of the Act applicable to
trusts "theretofore", i.e., prior to the effective date of the Act, created. The
constitutionality of a retroactive operation of the Act will depend on the
existence or nonexistence of any vested property right in the life tenants or
remainderman subject to interference by the legislative enactment.
Catherwood Trust, 405 Pa. 61, 71, 173 A.2d 86, 90-91 (1961).
This implication would not be necessary if the court had rested its decision on
statutory construction, ruling that the legislature could not have intended these small
stock dividends to be within the "all [stock] dividends . . . shall be deemed principal"
language of the act. However, the court did not take this approach since it conceded
that under the act small stock dividends to trusts created after 1945 go to principal.
38 See instant case at 112-13, 191 A.2d at 408 (dissenting opinion).
39 Pa. Laws 1963, act 233, § 5.
40 Section 5. Corporate Dividends and Share Rights. (1) Corporate dis-
tributions made to a trustee in the shares of the distributing corporation,
however described or designated by the distributing corporation, shall be
deemed principal but if the number of shares of any class distributed to share-
holders of such class is six percent (6%) or less of the number of shares
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present case the benefit of the amendment does not justify judicial anticipa-
tion of a legislative enactment.
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE-CLAIMANT WHo LEFT EM-
PLOYMENT To MOVE WITH HUSBAND TO RURAL AREA GRANTED
COMPENSATION
Claimant, a grocery store clerk, gave up her job to move with her
husband to a rural area that had two grocery stores in a twelve-mile
radius. She -tried to get work in both stores, but failed because each
employed only one full-time clerk. Although she was qualified to do office
work, she did not apply for any; nor did she search for work outside the
twelve mile area. The Unemployment Security Commission awarded her
benefits for one year, but when she reapplied the following year," the
Commission found her ineligible for compensation because she was "un-
available for work." 2 The state supreme court affirmed a lower court
reversal of the Commission. Parsons v. Unemployment Security Cornm'n,
71 N.M. 405, 379 P.2d 57 (1963).
The purpose of unemployment compensation is to assist the involun-
tarily unemployed; 3 therefore, a claimant may be disqualified from benefits
if he voluntarily leaves work without "good cause." 4 Subtle policy ques-
tions are involved in determining whether married women 5 should be
entitled to benefits since their domestic obligations frequently compete with
employment responsibilities. Some legislatures have expressly disqualified
people who leave work for marital reasons; 6 others accomplish the same
of that class outstanding on the record date for such distribution, the shares
so distributed shall be deemed income.
Ibid. See also the new six percent rule adopted in New York which differs from
Pennsylvania's rule in several significant respects. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS ch. 1005
(McKinney 1963). See generally Niles, supra note 20.
1 Claimant exhausted her benefits for the first year in eighteen weeks. See
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-9-3(c) (1960). The present litigation concerns her attempt
to receive benefits for a second year.
2 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-9-4(c) (1960) states that a worker will be held in-
eligible for benefits unless "he is able to work and is available for work, and is
actively seeking work."
a See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-9-2 (1960); ALTmAN, AVAILABILITY FOR WORK 13
(1950). See generally Burns, Unemployment Compensation and Socio-Economic Ob-
jectives 55 YALE L.J. 1 (1945).
4 The disqualification is often for a temporary period. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 31-236(2) (1958) (during first five weeks after voluntarily leaving work);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-9-5 (1960) (for not more than 13 nor less than 1 week
following the voluntarily leaving of work).
5 As of March 1961 married women comprised 21 percent of the civilian labor
force. Statistical Abstract of the United States, Tables 280, 292 (83d ed. 1962).
6 See, e.g., OHIO Rxv. CODE ANN. § 4141.29(9) (Page 1953); ORE. REv. STAT.
§657.160 (1961). See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 801(f), 802(b) (2) (Supp.
1962) which disqualifies an employee who leaves work to accompany his or her
spouse unless, during the previous six months, the employee has provided the major
support for the family.
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result by disqualifying all who leave their jobs without "good cause con-
nected with [their] work." 7
When a statute merely disqualifies for leaving work without "good
cause," courts have not agreed on the status of persons who leave for
marital reasons.8 Those courts that disqualify wives leaving work in
order to move to another locality with their husbands have interpreted the
words "good cause" to mean good cause having some "connection with
. . . the employment." 9  This interpretation prevents wives who have
decided permanently to devote their time to the home from receiving
unemployment benefits, 10 but may also cause hardship for wives intending
to return to the labor market. In the present case, the Commission did not
dispute the "good cause" 11 of the claimant's separation from employment,
and the issue was not before the court. The Commission's acquiescence on
this point is a proper recognition that an individual's decisions on employ-
ment are integrally related to his other moral and legal obligations.1 A
socially desirable objective such as maintaining family unity should con-
stitute "good cause" for leaving employment. Perhaps married women
who have indicated that their primary commitment is to the family should
not receive benefits until other groups have been compensated. However,
legislatures should not mechanically disqualify women who leave work to
join their husbands, since criteria are available to test the reality of a
migratory spouse's attachment to the labor force.'
3
7See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §215 (1951) (disqualification for 6 weeks).
See also CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21-236(2) (a) (1958) (disqualification for 5
weeks) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 96.5(1) (1946) ; MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 17.531 (1960) ;
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 288.050(1) (1949) ; TEx. Ruv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5221b-3 (1962)
(disqualification for 1 to 26 benefit periods).
8 For cases disqualifying claimant, see Woodmen of World Life Ins. Soc'y v.
Olsen, 141 Neb. 776, 4 N.W.2d 923 (1942); Dawkins Unemployment Compensation
Case, 358 Pa. 224, 233, 56 A.2d 254, 259 (1948) (dictum) ; Dan River Mills, Inc. v.
Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 195 Va. 997, 81 S.E.2d 620 (1954). But see
Berry, Whitson & Berry v. Division of Employment Security, 21 N.J. 73, 120 A.2d
742 (1956); Sturdevant Unemployment Compensation Case, 158 Pa. Super. 548,
45 A.2d 898 (1946).
9 Woodmen of World Life Ins. Soc'y v. Olsen, supra note 8, at 778, 4 N.W.2d
at 924 (1942).
10 See Dawkins Unemployment Compensation Case, 358 Pa. 224, 233, 56 A.2d
254, 259 (1948) (dictum).
11 Since the New Mexico act provides for at most a 13-week disqualification for
a claimant who leaves work without good cause, see note 3 supra, the claimant in
the instant case would be entitled to the benefits she is claiming so long as she is
"available for work."
12 [I]f a worker leaves his employment when he is compelled to do so by
necessitous circumstances or because of legal or family obligations, his leaving
is voluntary with good cause, and under the act he is entitled to benefits.
The pressure of necessity, of legal duty, or family obligations, or other over-
powering circumstances and his capitulation to them transform what is
ostensibly voluntary unemployment into involuntary unemployment.
Sturdevant Unemployment Compensation Case, 158 Pa. Super. 548, 557, 45 A.2d 898,
903 (1946).
13 See text accompanying notes 27-29 infra.
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The actual issue before the court was whether the claimant was eligible
for compensation under the statutory requirement that all claimants be
"available for work." The court purported to follow a line of "liberal"
cases 14 in holding claimant eligible for benefits. 15 Instead of constantly
iterating its adherence to liberal construction of the statute, the court should
have examined more closely the reality of claimant's alleged attachment to
the labor force.16 The first factor to be considered is the demand in the
area for the type of service the claimant can offer.'7 The claimant's desire
to work, standing alone, should not make him eligible for compensation '
8
except in atypical situations-as, for example, when a woman who can
work only as a homeworker is unemployed because of the state's refusal
to grant her a homeworker's certificate,'9 or when a factory worker is
without work because a governmental regulation makes it unlawful for
employers to hire him.20 However, when, as in the case of seasonal
workers, there are virtually no suitable jobs in the area, the claimant should
be obliged to enlarge the scope of his search for work.21  The rationale
for this rule is that a person is not attached to a labor market when he
resides in an area in which demand for his services is highly unlikely in
either the future 22 or the present.23  In the present case, since there were
14 Instant case at 409, 379 P.2d at 59-60.
15 See Reger v. Administrator, 132 Conn. 647, 46 A.2d 844 (1946); Ashmore v.
Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 46 Del. (7 Terry) 565, 86 A.2d 751 (Super.
Ct. 1952); Leonard v. Unemployment Compensation Bd., 148 Ohio St. 419, 75
N.E.2d 567 (1947); Felegy Unemployment Compensation Case, 158 Pa. Super. 567,
45 A.2d 906 (1946); Sturdevant Unemployment Compensation Case, 158 Pa. Super.
548, 45 A.2d 898 (1946).
16 See Valenti v. Board of Review, 4 N.J. 287, 72 A.2d 516 (1950); ALTMAN,
AVAILABILITY FOR WORK 109 (1950); Freeman, Able To Work and Available for
Work, 55 YALE L.J. 123, 124 (1945); Williams, Eligibility for Benefits, 8 VAND.
L. Ray. 286, 289 (1955).
17 See Krauss v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 13 N.J. 447, 460, 100 A.2d 277,
284 (1953) ; Valenti v. Board of Review, supra note 16; ALTMAN, AVAILABILITY FOR
WORK 110 (1950).
18 See generally ALTMAN, op. cit. supra note 17, at 122-31 (1950) ; 17 FORDHAM
L. REv. 150 (1948).
19 Smith v. Murphy, 267 App. Div. 468, 46 N.Y.S.2d 774 (1944). A home-
worker is one who does industrial work at home. It is unlawful for employers to
give a homeworking job to someone who does not have a homeworker's certificate.
20Mishaw v. Fairfield News, 12 Conn. Supp. 318 (Super. Ct. 1944). When
claimant quit his job, his employer refused to give him a "statement of availability."
In order to insure the most effective utilization of labor during wartime, it was
unlawful for employers to hire a worker who did not have this "statement."
21 See Teague v. Florida Industrial Comm'n, 104 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 1958);
Florida Industrial Comm'n v. Ciarlante, 84 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1955); Mohler v. Depart-
ment of Labor, 409 Ill. 79, 97 N.E.2d 762 (1951); In re Leshner, 268 App. Div.
582, 50 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1944).
22 Strictly speaking, this statement does not apply to seasonal workers because
there will be a demand for these workers when their working season arrives. I-ow-
ever, the increased demand for them springs from a drastic, albeit predictable,
change in the makeup of the area's labor market. Therefore, it is more accurate
to say that the labor market in the area has changed than that there has been a
substantially increased demand for the workers' services in the labor market.
23 Freeman, supra note 16, at 124: "A labor market for an individual exists
when there is a market for the type of services which he offers in the geographical
area in which he offers them."
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only two grocery stores nearby, claimant should have been denied benefits,
unless office work was being performed in the area, on the ground that
suitable jobs were so scarce as to render her unattached to the labor force.
If there are enough suitable jobs in the area to make it reasonably
probable that there will be some future demand for claimant's services,
claimant's overall employment record, 24 the length of his present unemploy-
ment,25 and the attempts which he has made to find new work 26 should
be evaluated to determine whether he is genuinely attached to the existing
labor force. When a married woman claimant is moving with her husband
to a new area, the amount by which her job opportunities were decreased
by the move to the new area,2 7 the reason for moving,28 and the
family's knowledge of the probable situation in the new area 0 test further
the genuineness of her attachment. A final factor to consider is the
woman's role in providing for her family.30 A woman who has been
strictly a supplemental earner does not have the same commitment to the
labor force as one who is the primary provider for her family. Thus, if
it is unclear whether or not a claimant is genuinely attached to the labor
force, her position as the primary provider for her family over a consider-
able length of time should resolve doubts in her favor.
In the present case, the first group of factors do not favor the claimant.
While her overall employment record was not known, claimant had been
unemployed for over a year. The remaining factors further weaken claim-
ant's position. Even if the claimant's move were dictated by reasons
essential to the welfare of her family, as, for example, the health of her
husband, her failure to seek available employment at offices 31 as well as
in the grocery stores should have made her ineligible for benefits. Whereas
claimant was actually employed in her old location, there were few job
24 See ALTMAN, op. cit. mpra note 17, at 110.
25 See Guidice v. Board of Review, 14 N.J. Super. 335, 82 A.2d 206 (1951);
De Rose v. Board of Review, 6 N.J. Super. 164, 70 A.2d 516 (1950) ; ALTMAN, op.
cit. supra note 17, at 112.
26The New Mexico act, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-9-4(c) (1960), and many other
unemployment acts, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 288.040(1) (2) (1949), require that
claimants be "actively seeking work." When state acts do not specifically demand
this from claimant, judicial decisions still make it a part of "availability for work"
Teague v. Florida Industrial Comm'n, 104 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 1958) ; Florida Industrial
Comm'n v. Ciarlante, 84 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1955).
2 7 Cf. Mo. ANN. STAT. §288.050(1)(2)(b) (1949).
28 See Raytheon Co. v. Director, 182 N.E.2d 293, 296 (Mass. 1962).
29 See Claim of Sapp, 266 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Idaho 1954) (dictum).
S0 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 801(f), 802(b) (2) (Supp. 1962).
3 1 Claimant's position might be strengthened if it were clear that the adminis-
trative agency in the area would be almost certain to notify her when any suitable
job for her arose. There is no indication that this is the situation in the present
case. In fact, the Commission expressly found that claimant was not "actively seek-
ing work" as required by N.M. STAT. Aisfx. §§ 59-9-4(c) (1960). This implies a
finding that the claimant's efforts in seeking work were not reasonable under the
circumstances. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Office of Unemployment Compensation &
Placement, 27 Wash. 2d 641, 179 P.2d 707 (1947). The court gives no cogent
explanation for the reversal of this finding. Instant case at 411, 379 P.2d at 61.
19631
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opportunities for her in the new one. Furthermore, because of the rural
nature of the new area, the family probably knew that job opportunities
would be scarce there. The court's reversal of the Commission's finding
that claimant was not "available for work" seems erroneous.
UNFAIR COMPETITION-BUSINESS EIJOINED FROM USING A
SIMILAR BUT NONIDENTICAL NAME TO THAT EMPLOYED BY A NoN-
COMPETING CORPORATION MANUFACTURING UNRELATED PRODUCTS
The plaintiff, Polaroid Corp., has an established reputation for quality
and financial responsibility as a manufacturer and world-wide distributor
of photographic, optical, and scientific products. The defendant, Polaraid,
Inc., began doing business in 1953 as a heating and refrigeration con-
tractor. It primarily installs and services skating rinks and industrial
cold storage facilities in a three-state area, confining its advertising to
skating rink magazines and trade journals. Although defendant's in-
corporators knew of the plaintiff's use of "Polaroid" at the time they
adopted "Polaraid," they did not give consideration to the possibility of
confusion. The latter name resulted from the combination of "polar,"
suggesting cold, and "aid," a synonym for service. On ten occasions
correspondence or publications had referred to the defendant as "Polaroid,
Inc.," or mail intended for one of the parties had been received by the
other. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, one Judge dissenting,
held that the defendant's use of "Polaraid" as a corporate name constituted
unfair competition with Polaroid Corp. and also violated the Illinois "anti-
dilution" statute.' The court remanded the case for the granting of in-
junctive relief. Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc., 319 F.2d 830 (7th Cir.
1963), reversing 206 F. Supp. 290 (N.D. Ill. 1962).
The use by another of the plaintiff's trademark was originally enjoined
as unfair competition only if it misled purchasers seeking the plaintiff's
products 2 and if the plaintiff could show that sales had actually been
diverted.3 More recently, the courts have enjoined the use of confusingly
similar trademarks or trade names even on noncompeting goods and services
1 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140, § 22 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1962):
Every person, association, or union of workingmen adopting and using
a mark, trade name, label or form of advertisement may proceed by suit,
and all courts having jurisdiction thereof shall grant injunctions, to enjoin
subsequent use by another of the same or any similar mark, trade name,
label or form of advertisement if there exists a likelihood of injury to
business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark,
trade name, label or form of advertisement of the prior user, notwithstanding
the absence of competition between the parties or of confusion as to the
source of goods or services ....
2 There is no right to the exclusive use of a word as such, but only to its use
as a symbol of the plaintiff's business, capable of affecting its good will. See
American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372 (1926).
3 See, e.g., Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 201 Fed. 510
(7th Cir. 1912).
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if they find a likelihood that purchasers will be misled 4 into believing that
the products or services originate with the plaintiff--confusion of source-, 5
or that the plaintiff is connected with the source through affiliation, license,
or endorsement-confusion of sponsorship.6  Although protection of the
public is sometimes the articulated reason for relief,7 the actual basis is the
potential injury to the plaintiff from the attribution to him of another's
goods or services." A showing that defendant intended to utilize plain-
tiff's good will by creating purchaser confusion has been held sufficient in
itself to make such confusion likely. 9  Absent intent or identity of names,
4 "No one need expose his reputation to the trade practices of another, even
though he can show no pecuniary loss." Adolph Kastor & Bros. v. FTC, 138 F.2d
824, 826 (2d Cir. 1943) (L. Hand, J.). See Baker v. Simmons Co., 307 F.2d 458,
463 (1st Cir. 1962); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Dunnell, 172 F.2d 649, 657 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949); Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S.
Kresge Co., 119 F.2d 316, 323 (6th Cir. 1941), rev'd on other grounds, 316 U.S. 203
(1942). But see Avon Shoe Co. v. David Crystal, Inc., 279 F.2d 607 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 909 (1960), in which the court found that defendant's repu-
tation and past performance were such as to indicate that confusion would enhance
rather than detract from plaintiff's reputation and refused injunctive relief, although
a substantial likelihood of confusion was found to exist; Triangle Publications v.
Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969, 981 (2d Cir. 1948) (dissenting opinion).
5 See, e.g., American Foods, Inc. v. Golden Flake, Inc., 312 F.2d 619 (5th Cir.
1963) (enjoining use of "Golden Flake" on refrigerated rolls upon petition of plain-
tiff using same words on baked goods) ; Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d
34 (2d Cir. 1945) (enjoining use of "V-8" on vitamins when plaintiff vegetable
juice manufacturer used same mark) ; Wisconsin Elec. Co. v. Dumore Co., 35 F.2d
555 (6th Cir. 1929) (use of "Dumore" on electric washers enjoined when previously
in use by manufacturer of small electric appliances and motors).
6 See, e.g., Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc., 313 F.2d 472 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 374 U.S. 806 (1963) (enjoining use of "Wellington" as name of financial
management company upon petition of mutual fund); Baker v. Simmons Co., 307
F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1962) (use of "Simmonds" as name of corporation reupholstering
furniture enjoined when "Simmons" was previously used by manufacturer of new furni-
ture) ; Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. A. & P. Cleaners & Dyers, Inc., 10 F. Supp.
450 (W.D. Pa. 1934) (use of "A. & P." and misrepresentations by defendant as to
connection with food stores enjoined).
7 See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 277 F.2d 896, 900
(7th Cir. 1960).
8 "The deception of the public naturally tends to injure the proprietor of a
business by diverting his customers and depriving him of sales which otherwise he
might have made. This, rather than the protection of the public against imposition,
is the sound and true basis for the private remedy." Borden Ice Cream Co. v.
Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 201 Fed. 510, 513 (7th Cir. 1912).
9 See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Ultem Publications, Inc., 96 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1938)
(per curiam) ; My-T Fine Corp. v. Samuels, 69 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1934); Chester
Barrie, Ltd. v. Chester Laurie, Ltd., 189 F. Supp. 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). Intent is
always considered strong evidence of a likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., National
Van Lines v. Dean, 237 F.2d 688, 692 (9th Cir. 1956); Societe Anonyme de la
Grande Distillerie E. Cusenier Fils Aine & Cie. v. Julius Wile Sons & Co., 161 F.
Supp. 545, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
When the name or mark adopted by the defendant is the same word as that
used by the plaintiff, and the word is coined, having no meaning except as the
plaintiff's trade symbol, or is fanciful and nondescriptive as applied to both busi-
nesses, the courts have found its adoption by the defendant indicative of intent to
cause confusion. The courts can find no other likely reason for its adoption, especially
since there is little possibility that the defendant arrived at the same coined word
independently. See Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348, 355 (9th Cir.
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however, relief is ordinarily denied unless the products or services of the
parties are such that purchasers would be likely to associate them with
a single company.' 0
In the present case, there appears to be little relation between the
plaintiff's products and the defendant's services that would lead purchasers
to believe that the plaintiff is responsible for both. Moreover, the
defendant deals with a small clientele who seem likely to be well informed
before choosing a specific contractor because of the expense and complexity
of the service offered." The few instances in which the identities of the
parties may have been confused are inconclusive since this confusion was
not among purchasers and apparently lacked economic significance. Dur-
ing the ten years in which the defendant had been in existence, mail was
three times misdirected, but there was no confusion on the part of the
correspondents about the identity of the party with whom they were deal-
ing.12 The other seven stipulated instances of confusion were ones in which
1948). However, a word may be fanciful as applied to one product and descriptive
as applied to another. Creamette Co. v. Conlin, 191 F.2d 108, 112 (5th Cir. 1951)
("Creamette" fanciful as applied to macaroni and spaghetti, but descriptive of a
substitute for ice cream).
'0 In cases in which no actual confusion among purchasers is shown, the likeli-
hood of confusion is necessarily decided by the court. See Drexel Enterprises, Inc. v.
Richardson, 312 F.2d 525 (10th Cir. 1962); Baker -v. Simmons Co., 307 F.2d 458
(1st Cir. 1962) ; Intercontinental Mfg. Co. v. Continental Motors Corp., 230 F.2d 621
(C.C.P.A. 1956).
In Triangle Publications v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1948), Judge Frank,
dissenting from a majority opinion finding a likelihood of customer confusion as to
sponsorship between "Seventeen" girdles and "Seventeen" magazine, concluded that,
"As neither the trial judge nor any member of this court is (or resembles) a
teen-age girl or the mother or sister of such a girl, our judicial notice apparatus
will not work well unless we feed it with information directly obtained from
'teen-agers' or from their female relatives accustomed to shop for them." 167 F.2d
at 976. Judge Frank had interviewed a number of these potential customers of de-
fendant's girdles and had been uniformly told that "no one could reasonably believe
that any relation existed between plaintiff's magazine and defendant's girdles."
Ibid. Judge Frank concluded that testimony of investigators, who had directly ques-
tioped sales clerks while making purchases as to the existence of a connection be-
tween the parties, was not helpful because of the unavoidably "slanted" nature of
this questioning and the interest of the clerk in making a sale. Id. at 977. Compare
Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Western States Cutlery & Mfg. Co., 227 F.2d 728,
731 (10th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 937 (1956); Steem-Elec. Corp. v.
Herzfeld-Phillipson Co., 118 F.2d 122, 124 (7th Cir. 1940). He also discounted testi-
mony by members of the retail trade and the advertising industry as serving merely
to substitute their opinions for that of the court. 167 F.2d at 977. See Singer Mfg.
Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 178 (1896).
In Steem-Elec. Corp. v. Herzfeld-Phillipson Co., supra, the court found it sig-
nificant that "not a single bona fide customer for plaintiff's iron testified in behalf
of the plaintiff."
11 Courts have found purchaser confusion unlikely when defendant sells expensive
goods or services to experienced and discriminating customers. See Lawyers Title
Ins. Co. v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 109 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1939), cert. denied,
309 U.S. 684 (1940); Camloc Fastener Corp. v. OPW Corp., 164 F. Supp. 15
(S.D.N.Y. 1958), aff'd inee., 271 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1959) ; National Motor Bearing
Co. v. James-Pond-Clark, 266 F.2d 799 (C.C.P.A. 1959); Magnaflux Corp. v.
Sonoflux Corp., 231 F.2d 669 (C.C.P.A. 1956).
12None of this mail was addressed to the wrong party, rather in one case the
address was vague, while the other two cases showed misdelivery by the post office.
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publications or correspondents referred to the defendant as "Polaroid,
Inc." Four of these instances arose in reports concerning the present
litigation and may be discounted as products of anevent unlikely to recur.
13
The others involved articles in a trade publication, an Iowa newspaper, and
a national business weekly. But none of these mistaken parties was deal-
ing with the litigants, and no dissatisfaction with Polaroid's honesty or the
quality of its products could result from such mistakes.14 The court appears
to have settled for mere confusion of identity instead of requiring a likeli-
hood of confusion among the defendant's customers, thus widening the
scope of judicial inquiry to include the beliefs of the general public. 15
The court seems to have implicitly extended the action for unfair
competition beyond the limits of the traditional confusion doctrine, and
may have recognized the "dilution" theory as a basis for relief.' 6 This
theory would protect the advertising value of a unique and distinctive name
or mark capable of arousing favorable associations in the public mind, al-
though there is no showing of likely customer confusion.17 The theory
rests upon the psychological propositions that a significant number of sales
are motivated in part by the effect of a distinctive name or mark, and that
its use by any other company will reduce this effect. For example, the
use of the name "Cadillac" on dog food could impair the power of that
name to convey impressions of quality and exclusiveness. The theory
recognizes the investment that often underlies an effective symbol.
In Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 182 F. Supp. 350 (E.D.N.Y. 1960),
aff'd, 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961) (plaintiff held barred
by laches), the trial court pointed out that the average daily volume of mail received
by Polaroid is 1000 pieces. 182 F. Supp. at 354. In relation to this figure, the
misdelivery of three pieces over a ten-year period seems insignificant, even if they
were the result of purchaser confusion.
13 A Dun & Bradstreet report of the case not only referred to the defendant as
"Polaroid, Inc.," but also said that it was plaintiff in the action. The Official
Gazette of the Patent Office listed the case as "Polaroid Corp. v. Polaroid, Inc.,"
and correspondence received by the plaintiff from West Publishing Co. and the Clerk
of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit also contained this incorrect refer-
ence to the case.
14 The article in the trade publication was an account of a guided tour of facilities
installed by the defendant which made no reference to the quality of those facilities,
but dealt with the storing and processing of bananas in the plant through which
the tour was made. The newspaper article was an account of a labor dispute at
a meat packing plant for which the defendant was doing some work. Defendant
wvas not involved in the dispute, but was only referred to in a list of contractors
whose employees refused to cross picket lines. Barron's National Business & Finan-
cial Weekly listed the defendant among several "refrigeration specialists" in a dis-
cussion of the growth of the skating rink business.
15 If the defendant sells his products or services to the general public, their
beliefs are relevant as being those of purchasers. But when, as in the present case,
the defendant deals only with a small selected group, the beliefs of persons outside
that group should be afforded little significance in establishing the likelihood of pur-
chaser confusion.
16 Instant case at 834-35, quoting from National City Bank v. National City
Window Cleaning Co., 174 Ohio St. 150, 190 N.E.2d 437, 438 (1963) (dictum)
(relief granted upon finding of confusion of sponsorship).
17 See 3 CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKs 1642 (2d ed.
1950), Derenberg, The Problem of Trademark Dilution and the Antidilution Statutes,
44 CALIF. L. REv. 439 (1956) ; Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protec-
tion, 40 HAuv. L. REv. 813 (1927) ; 51 CALIF. L. REv. 250 (1963).
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Other courts have spoken the language of dilution, but have strained
to find likely confusion in order to fit their decisions within the traditional
rationales.' 8 They may feel that it is inequitable for a defendant to profit
from the use of an already familiar mark without having contributed to its
creation, even though the "free ride" does not cause customer confusion.
Some federal courts, on the other hand, have expressly denied recognition
of the theory as a ground for relief. 19 If it is to be recognized, however,
the "dilution" theory should apply only to names or marks identical to the
plaintiff's, and the plaintiff should bear the burden of proving that its name
possesses an aura of exclusiveness and quality.
The Illinois statute on which the court alternatively relied is one of
four state "antidilution" statutes of essentially identical content.20 Courts
have not construed these statutes as enacting the dilution theory, however,
but have interpreted them as merely providing that relief should be granted
although the parties are not competitors, if there is a likelihood of con-
fusion.2 1 Yet, even if the Illinois statute embodies the dilution theory, the
present result seems unwarranted. The defendant confines its advertising
to trade publications received only by potential customers for its services.
The plaintiff sells its products to the general public, numerous corpora-
tions, and agencies of the federal government, the overwhelming majority
of which would never hear of the defendant. Moreover, defendant's use of
a polar bear in conjunction with its name in advertising tends to emphasize
the different sense in which the root-word "polar" is used by the parties-
the plaintiff's use suggests the polarization of light, whereas the defendant's
use suggests coldness. The degree of dilution of the distinctiveness of the
word "Polaroid" that is likely from such limited use of a nonidentical word
with inherent suggestions of its own seems slight.
Since the extent of the injunctive relief to be granted in the present
case will be initially determined by the district court, the injury to the
defendant may be minimized by requiring that it change its name to
18 Some of these decisions fit more comfortably into the dilution theory than
the traditional rationale. See Chemical Corp. of America v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,
306 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 965 (1963) (use of brewer's
advertising slogan in connection with an insecticide floor wax enjoined on ground of
likelihood of confusion of sponsorship); Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d
348 (9th Cir. 1948) (use of name "Stork Club" and drawing of stork with top
hat and monocle by small bar in San Francisco enjoined as likely to cause confusion
of sponsorship) ; Bulova Watch Co. v. Stolzberg, 69 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1947)
(use of "Bulova" on shoes enjoined); Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Dunhill
Shirt Shop, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1929) (confusion of source found likely
between smoking supplies and shirts) ; 51 CALIF. L. Rav. 250, 252 (1963).
19. See Champion Paper & Fibre Co. v. National Ass'n of Mut. Ins. Agents,
148 F. Supp. 123, 124 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 249 F.2d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1957), in which the
court said, "the [dilution] doctrine has not been adopted by the Federal courts";
G. B. Kent & Sons v. P. Lorillard Co., 114 F. Supp. 621, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
2 0
ILL. AN. STAT. ch. 140, § 22 (Smith-Hurd 1962 Supp.); GA. CODE ANN.
§g106-15; MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 110, §7A (1954); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §368-d
(1963 Supp.).
21 See Esquire, Inc. v. Esquire Slipper Mfg. Co., 243 F.2d 540, 544 (1st Cir.
1957); Joshua Meier Co. v. Albany Novelty Mfg. Co., 236 F.2d 144, 148 (2d Cir.
1956); Libby, McNeill & Libby v. Libby, 103 F. Supp. 968, 970 (D. Mass. 1952);
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"Polar-Aid" or some other slight variation. The present opinion should
then be satisfied, and the plaintiff amply protected, since the public does
not seem likely to associate such a name with "Polaroid." Significantly,
the defendant would not be wholly deprived of the economic value of its
name, which would retain its descriptive nature and familiarity to defend-
ant's customers.
VENDORS AND PURCHASERS-PURCHASER AWARDED Co-
VEYANCE OF DAMAGED REALTY WITH CONTRACT PRICE REDUCED
BY VENDoR'S INsuRANCE PROCEEDS ALTHOUGHa VENDOR HAD RIsK
OF Loss
Prior to settlement of a $20,000 contract for the sale of land, the major
building on the land was destroyed by fire. There was evidence that the
market value of the unimproved land alone equalled the contract price and
that purchaser intended to remove the building in order to erect an auto-
mobile service station. The building was valued at $12,000 and vendor,
under the Missouri "valued policy law," 1 received the full amount of his
$10,000 insurance policy. Purchaser sought specific performance of the
contract with an abatement of the contract price to the extent of the
insurance proceeds. The Supreme Court of Missouri unanimously over-
ruled that corollary of the doctrine of equitable conversion which places
the risk of destruction upon the purchaser,2 and adopted the "Massa-
chusetts" rule which places the risk of destruction upon the vendor.3
Thereupon the court, three judges dissenting, affirmed the trial court decree
granting purchaser the requested relief.4 Skelly Oil Co. v. Ashmore, 365
S.W.2d 582 (Mo. 1963).
Allocation of the risk of loss that may occur between the signing of
a land contract and final conveyance is normally determined by the contract
Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Food Fair, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 445 (D. Mass. 1948), aff'd,
177 F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1949); Skil Corp. v. Barnet, 337 Mass. 485, 150 N.E.2d 551
(1958) ; Healer v. Bloomberg Bros., 321 Mass. 476, 73 N.E.2d 895 (1947) ; Interna-
tional Latex Corp. v. Revlon Prods. Corp., 3 Misc. 2d 487, 148 N.Y.S.2d 304 (Sup.
Ct. 1955); Peerless Elec. Co. v. Peerless Elec., Inc., 206 Misc. 965, 135 N.Y.S.2d
885 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
1 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 379.140 (1959) provides that an insurer cannot deny that the
property was worth the amount for which it was insured. See 1 RlcHARDs, INsURANCE
§21 (5th ed. 1952).
2 See Snyder v. Murdock, 51 Mo. 175 (1872) ; Standard Oil Co. v. Dye, 223 Mo.
App. 926, 20 S.W.2d 946 (1929).
3 See Libman v. Levenson, 236 Mass. 221, 128 N.E. 13 (1920).
4 The dissenting opinion would have denied purchaser any rights in the insurance
money, but granted specific performance with an abatement to the extent purchaser
could show damages.
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itself. Under the doctrine of equitable conversion, followed in a majority
of jurisdictions, a contract silent on this question transfers equitable title
to the purchaser who bears the risk of any loss not caused by the vendor.5
In most of thdse jurisdictions, the purchaser is entitled to the benefit of
the vendor's insurance proceeds.6 A minority of courts holds that the
vendor has the risk of loss on the common-law theory that impossibility
of performance releases both parties from their contractual obligations.
7
If substantial loss occurs, the purchaser may rescind and recover any money
paid towards the purchase price." When the purchaser seeks to enforce
despite substantial damage, the extent, if any, of the vendor's obligation
under the minority rule is unsettled.9  One court has released the vendor
from any liability in damages for his failure to perform fully,' but others
have required him to convey if the purchaser is willing to pay the agreed
price despite the damage." Dictum prior to the present case indicated
that the vendor would be excused from performance if the purchaser
demanded conveyance for a sum equal to the agreed price less a reduction
for the damage.' 2 If the damage is not regarded as substantial, however,
the impossibility rule does not apply, and either party can enforce, although
5 See 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.30 (Casner ed. 1952). If at the time
of the loss the vendor has a defective title, or is otherwise in default, however, the
purchaser is released. E.g., Amundson v. Severson, 41 S.D. 377, 170 N.W. 633
(1919) ; see 4 W.LISTON, CONTRAcrs § 932, at 2613 (rev. ed. 1936).
6 E.g., Godfrey v. Alcorn, 215 Ky. 465, 284 S.W. 1094 (1926). The theory is
that the vendor holds the proceeds in trust for the purchaser. See Vanneman, Risk
of Loss, In Equity, Between the Date of Contract To Sell Real Estate and Transfer
of Title, 8 MiNN. L. REv. 127, 138 (1924). Two states appear to deny the purchaser
this benefit. See White v. Gilman, 138 Cal. 375, 71 Pac. 436 (1903); Brownell v.
Board of Educ., 239 N.Y. 369, 146 N.E. 630 (1925) (dictum, as vendor had expressly
assumed risk). But cf. Raplee v. Piper, 3 N.Y.2d 179, 143 N.E.2d 919, 164 N.Y.S.2d
732 (1957).
7 See, e.g., Wells v. Calnan, 107 Mass. 514 (1871). Other courts allocate the risk
on the basis of possession. See Annot., 27 A.L.R.2d 444, 460-69 (1953). This view
is incorporated in UNIFORM VENDOR AND PURCHASER RIsK ACT § 1, adopted in eight
states. See 9C UNIFORm LAWS ANNOTATED 313 (Supp. 1962).
S E.g., Anderson v. Yaworski, 120 Conn. 390, 181 AtI. 205 (1935); Wilson v.
Clark, 60 N.H. 352 (1880) ; Connell v. Savings Bank, 47 R.I. 60, 129 Atl. 803 (1925).
9 Most of the cases employing the impossibility doctrine have involved vendors
seeking the purchase price or purchasers seeking recision. See, e.g., cases cited
note 8 supra.
10 Hawkes v. Kehoe, 193 Mass. 419, 79 N.E. 766 (1907).
11 Hallett v. Parker, 68 N.H. 598, 39 AtI. 433 (1896); Stapper v. Rusch, 127
Tex. 151, 92 S.W.2d 431 (1936); cf. Lampesis v. Travelers Ins. Co., 101 N.I. 323,
143 A.2d 104 (1958) (dictum).
12 Hawkes v. Kehoe, 193 Mass. 419, 79 N.E. 766 (1907) (dictum); Allyn v.
Allyn, 154 Mass. 570, 28 N.E. 779 (1891) (dictum) ; see RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
§ 460 (1932). But see Bautz v. Kuhworth, 1 Mont. 133 (1869). In Hawkes, pur-
chaser sued at law for damages on the theory that he had an election to sue either
for damages or to take partial performance with an abatement, but the court rejected
this theory saying that the vendor was released. In Allyn, the purchaser was given
performance with abatement as the contract had provided for accidental loss, but
the court indicated that had the contract been silent, this relief would not have been
available.
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an abatement may be given to the purchaser for damages.13 Although the
present court approved the doctrine of impossibility, it nevertheless re-
quired the vendor to convey subject to an abatement without having found
that the damage was insubstantial.
The insubstantial damage rule has been applied when the actual
damage, measured by the cost of replacement, was slight in relation to
the purchase price.14 "Insubstantial" may also mean that the total market
value of the property was essentially unchanged. 1 The latter definition
might include the present case, in which the value of the destroyed property
was relatively high, but the overall market value of the property was not
appreciably changed. However, it seems appropriate to apply the im-
possibility rule when there is a substantial change in the nature of the
property, even if the value remains fairly constant; otherwise, the vendor
could require a purchaser, who was seeking a residence, to take a vacant
lot now best suited for commercial use.16
If the present case is treated as one of substantial damage, the im-
possibility rule would apply; but, as the present court recognized, it does
not automatically follow that the vendor is released from conveying subject
to an abatement. Under the impossibility doctrine, the purchaser bears the
risk of losing the profits he would have made had the bargain been com-
pleted, while the vendor bears the risk of loss of the building and rescission
of the contract.1 7  To the extent that an abatement can be made without
imposing a liability on the vendor for the purchaser's loss of profits,' 8 the
doctrine would not dictate releasing the vendor from conveying subject to
an abatement.
There are, in addition, affirmative reasons for allowing the purchaser
this relief. Although a part of the bargain has been rendered impossible
of performance, the land, often an important part of the bargain, can be
conveyed. Since the vendor has bound himself to convey this land, the
13 Libman v. Levenson, 236 Mass. 221, 128 N.E. 13 (1920) (dictum); Capital
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Convey, 175 Wash. 224, 27 P.2d 136 (1933); cf. Bautz v.
Kuhworth, 1 Mont. 133 (1869).
14 Capital Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Convey, supra note 13.
15 Libman v. Levenson, 263 Mass. 221, 224, 128 N.E. 13, 14 (1920).
16 The purchaser in the present case would have suffered no hardship by being
compelled to take performance since he had planned to demolish the building. The
present court, however, seemed to give no weight to purchaser's intended use, stating
that such a decision was for the purchaser to make. Instant case at 589. This rationale
could serve to deny the vendor the right to specific performance even in the present
case.
17 See 6 CoRaiN, CO TRAcTS § 1321 (2d ed. 1962).
18 It has been argued that this relief necessarily imposes such a liability. 4
WIrIsroTN, CoNtRaAcTs § 935, at 2617 (rev. ed. 1936). Professor Williston suggests
that a court, in granting the purchaser such relief, is really settling two actions at
once, one for specific performance for the full contract price and another for damages
for vendor's breach as an abatement. Since there is no damage remedy under the
impossibility rule, he argues, there can be no abatement. See 5 WI.LISTON, CON-
TRAcTs § 1436, at 4016 (rev. ed. 1937). However, performance with abatement has
been granted although the purchaser had no legal remedy for damages for vendor's
breach save recovery of his deposit and expenses incurred. Compare Longwood v.
Holland, 131 Va. 186, 108 S.E. 571 (1921), with Matthews v. LaPrade, 130 Va. 408,
107 S.E. 795 (1921).
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purchaser would seem to be entitled to as much of the bargain as remains
without having to pay the full price. 19
Courts have traditionally allowed the purchaser to enforce the contract
subject to abatement, if the vendor bore the risk of destruction for reasons
other than the impossibility theory.20 This relief has been granted when
the vendor explicitly assumed the risk of destruction 21 and when the
vendor was in default in an equitable conversion jurisdiction.22 The
rights of the purchaser to a conveyance subject to an abatement should be
the same, whatever theory is used to place upon the vendor the risk of
destruction.23
When neither party is at fault, the purpose of an abatement is to
determine the amount of the purchaser's performance of the original bar-
gain, not to redistribute the losses occasioned by the fire. In formulating
its measure of abatement, the present court relied on two assumptions,
19 See Simpson, Legislative Changes in the Law of Equitable Conversion by Con-
tract, 44 YALE L.J. 754, 758 (1935) ; Legislation, 51 HARv. L. REV. 1276, 1279 (1938).
There may be cases in which the vendor shows equities so much greater than those
of the purchaser that performance with an abatement should be denied. See Phinizy
v. Guernsey, 111 Ga. 346, 351-52, 36 S.E. 796, 798-99 (1900).
One court, which placed the risk of loss on the vendor but did not adopt the
impossibility doctrine, nevertheless released the vendor from conveying subject to an
abatement on the ground that the abatement would so alter the contract price as to
amount to a new contract. Wheeler v. Gahan, 206 Ky. 366, 267 S.W. 227 (1924).
But see Godfrey v. Alcorn, 215 Ky. 465, 284 S.W. 1094 (1926) ; Simpson, supra at
759 (criticizing Wheeler). This result might, in effect, produce the same result as
that indicated in the dicta dealing with substantial damage under the impossibility
rule. See note 12 supra and accompanying text. However, unlike cases under the
impossibility rule, the purchaser would presumably still have an action for damages.
Cf. Merritz v. Circelli, 361 Pa. 239, 64 A.2d 796 (1949) (abatement denied because
cost of constructing sewer falsely warranted by vendor was two-thirds of purchase
price). Under the impossibility doctrine, however, relief should not be denied to
the purchaser merely because the amount of the abatement is large, but only if the
vendor has unusual equities in his favor. If a proportional measure of the abatement
is adopted, the actual abatement would not be as high as it would be under some
more prevalent measures. See text accompanying note 35 infra.
20Bit see Daum v. Lehde, 239 La. 890, 119 So. 2d 481 (1960). When the risk
is on the vendor in a jurisdiction using the possession test, it has been implied that the
purchaser cannot get an abatement. Appleton Elec. Co. v. Rogers, 200 Wis. 331,
228 N.W. 505 (1930). But see Phinizy v. Guernsey, 111 Ga. 346, 36 S.E. 796 (1900)
(abatement allowed but holding was alternative since vendor also had burden because
he was in default at time of loss). The Uniform Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act
is silent on the purchaser's right to enforce with abatement when the damage is sub-
stantial, but a lower New York court has stated that the act does not preclude this
relief. World Exhibit Corp. v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 186 Misc. 420, 423,
59 N.Y.S.2d 648, 651 (Sup. Ct. 1945), aff'd, 270 App. Div. 654, 61 N.Y.S.2d 889,
aff'd iner., 296 N.Y. 586, 68 N.E.2d 876 (1946) (dictum because contractual pro-
vision took case out of statute).
21 Allyn v. Allyn, 154 Mass. 570, 28 N.E. 779 (1891); Polisiuk v. Mayers, 205
App. Div. 573, 200 N.Y.S. 97 (1923); World Exhibit Corp. v. City Bank Farmers
Trust Co., supra note 20.
22 Phinizy v. Guernsey, 111 Ga. 346, 36 S.E. 796 (1900); Eppstein v. Kuhn,
225 Ill. 115, 80 N.E. 80 (1906); Lombard v. Chicago Sinai Congregation, 64 Ill,
477 (1872) ; cf. Dickinson v. Wright, 56 Mich. 42, 22 N.W. 312 (1885).
This relief may be appropriate when part of the land is condemned. See
Gillis v. Bonelli-Adams Co., 284 Mass. 176, 187 N.E. 535 (1933) (dictum); cf.
Salvatore v. Fuscellaro, 53 R.I. 271, 166 AtI. 26 (1933).
23 See Simpson, supra note 19, at 759. The purchaser is not entitled to enforce
the contract if he is in default at the time of the loss. Cf. Martin Grocery Co. v.
E. Meng Co., 212 Ky. 469, 279 S.W. 661 (1926).
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neither of which was necessarily true. The court's first assumption was
that in this case the insurance proceeds represented the value of the dam-
aged building.2 4 Many courts and writers have indicated that the vendor's
insurance proceeds should not be the measure of the abatement when the
vendor bears the risk of destruction. 5 Although this opposition has gen-
erally been based upon insurance law,26 it is also supported by common
knowledge that insurance proceeds do not always represent the actual
value of the damage suffered.2 7 The extent to which the vendor has
protected himself against the risk of destruction should not be determina-
tive of the amount of the purchaser's partial performance.2 8 Since the
absence of insurance is no reason to deny an abatement to the purchaser,
it is illogical to give the purchaser the land for nothing if the proceeds are
in excess of the contract price.2 9 As the purchaser is protected from loss
by his option to rescind, there is no apparent reason for giving him this
windfall.
30
24 See instant case at 589. Although the present court abated the contract
price to the extent of the insurance proceeds, it apparently did not hold, as do
the equitable conversion jurisdictions, that the proceeds were necessarily the measure
of the abatement. The building was in fact underinsured by $2,537, but the pur-
chaser, bringing suit under the prior Missouri equitable conversion doctrine, claimed
only the proceeds as an abatement. It is not clear from the court's opinion whether
in subsequent cases a purchaser could successfully argue that the building was worth
more than the proceeds, or whether a vendor could argue that the building was
worth less. Compare Burack v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 9 App. Div. 2d 914, 194
N.Y.S.2d 987 (1959) (memorandum), aff'd men. sub noma. 10 N.Y.2d 879, 179
N.E.2d 509, 223 N.Y.S.2d 505 (1961), modifying 6 Misc. 2d 450, 160 N.Y.S.2d 1008
(Sup. Ct. 1957) (trial court had held purchaser was to pay market value of prop-
erty after fire).
2 5 Phinizy v. Guernsey, 111 Ga. 346, 36 S.E. 796 (1900); Daum v. Lehde, 239
La. 890, 119 So. 2d 481 (1960); Brownell v. Board of Educ., 239 N.Y. 369, 146
N.E. 630 (1925); Appleton Elec. Co. v. Rogers, 200 Wisc. 331, 228 N.W. 505*
(1930); ef. Edlin v. Security Ins. Co., 269 F.2d 159 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 931, 932 (1960). See Simpson, supra note 19, at 764; 10 CORNmLL L.Q.
379, 381 (1925); 5 Wis. L. Rav. 503, 506 (1930). But see Harding v. Jewell, 73
Me. 426 (1882).
26The argument holds that an insurance policy is a contract of personal
indemnity between the insurer and the insured, and that it does not accrue to the
benefit of third parties. See Brownell v. Board of Educ., mtpra note 25.
2 7 If the vendor expressly assumes an obligation to insure for the benefit of the
purchaser however, the proceeds would be a proper abatement. Allyn v. Allyn,
154 Mass. 570, 28 N.E. 779 (1891).
2
8Compare First Natl Bank v. Boston Ins. Co., 17 Ill. 2d 147, 160 N.E.2d
802 (1959) (Schaeffer, J.), using a similar argument to support the conclusion that
the terms of the contract cannot measure the insurer's liability.
29These were the facts in Appleton Elec. Co. v. Rogers, 200 Wis. 331, 228
N.W. 505 (1930), in which the court rejected the purchaser's claims to the pro-
ceeds. If the proceeds exceed the amount of the abatement, either the vendor or
the insurer would receive a "windfall" depending on the court's construction of the
term "loss" in the policy. Compare First Nat'l Bank v. Boston Ins. Co., 17 11. 2d
147, 160 N.E.2d 802 (1959) (vendor), with Wohlt v. Farmers Home Hail, Tornado
& Cyclone Ins. Co., 206 Wis. 35, 238 N.W. 809 (1931) (insurer). See generally
Young, Some "Windfall" Coverages in Property and Liability lnsurance, 60 COLUm.
L. REv. 1063 (1960).
30 Cf. Edlin v. Security Ins. Co., 269 F.2d 159 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 931, 932 (1960); American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 38
Ill. App. 2d 315, 187 N.E.2d 343 (1962); Appleton Elec. Co. v. Rogers, supra
note 29.
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The court's second assumption was that the full value of the building
was represented in the contract price. Having already assumed that the
insurance proceeds represented the value of the building, the court abated
that value and ignored the value of the land received by the purchaser,
regardless of how substantial a part of the bargain the land might have
been. Abating the value of the building reimbursed the purchaser for the
lost building. But since the vendor bears the risk of this destruction he
should not also be required to indemnify the purchaser for this loss.3x A
determination of the value of the vendor's performance would seem neces-
sary to determine the performance to be required of the purchaser. The
abatement should not reflect the independent value of the building, there-
fore, but the effect this loss had upon the value of the original bargain.
There are two measures of abatement which are consistent with this
approach. One, which has been used in cases of destruction of realty by
fire, would subtract from the contract price the actual decrease in the prop-
erty value due to the fire.3 2 This measure, however, allows the purchaser
the benefit of whatever profits he would have made on the initial bargain.33
The other measure is concerned not with the actual decrease in the
property value but with the proportional decrease. This measure has been
used primarily when the vendor is unable to convey all the land that he
had promised.3 4 Thus, if the loss in value of the property was only one-
fifth of its original value, one-fifth of the contract price would be abated.
This formula is more in accord with the theory of impossibility than an
abatement of the actual decrease in value, since it does not give the
purchaser the full amount of his original profit, but only the profit
attributable to the land.3 5 Since the vendor is without fault, he should not
be obligated under the impossibility rule to compensate the purchaser for
the purchaser's unrealized profit. The doctrine normally releases the
defaulting party from liability for damages for breach of the contract.3 6
31 The value of the building could conceivably exceed the purchase price, and
an uninsured vendor in such a case would be required to convey the land while receiv-
ing nothing from his bargain. The vendor can, however, expressly assume such an
obligation. The purchaser could also justifiably claim full compensation if the de-
struction was due to the vendor's negligence. Cf. Cornish v. Strutton, 47 Ky. (8 B.
Mon.) 586 (1848).
32 Phinizy v. Guernsey, 111 Ga. 346, 36 S.E. 796 (1900); Eppstein v. Kuhn,
225 Ill. 115, 80 N.E. 80 (1906). But cf. Ingram v. Methodist Church Dist. Bd.
of Missions & Church Extension, Inc., 131 S.E.2d 848 (Ga. 1963) (dictum).
33 "Profits" refers to the amount by which the value of the improved property
exceeded the contract price. See Phinizy v. Guernsey, supra note 32, at 355, 36 S.E.
at 800.
34 E.g., McFarlane v. Dixon, 176 Wis. 652, 187 N.W. 671 (1922).
35 In the jurisdictions using this measure the purchaser has no remedy at law
for loss of profit damages. All he can recover are his deposit and expenses in-
curred. Matthews v. LaPrade, 130 Va. 408, 107 S.E. 795 (1921); McFarlane v.
Dixon, supra note 34; see 5 WMu.ISTON, CoNTRAcrs § 1436, at 4016 (rev. ed. 1937);
Note, 40 HAEv. L. Rxv. 476 (1927).
36The cases using the actual value measure, cases cited note 32 supra, were
not using the doctrine of impossibility. The risk of destruction was on the vendor
because of his default.
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When, as was apparently true in the present case, the value of the
improved property is equal to the contract price, there are no profits and
the above two measures would give identical results. However, there was
also evidence that there was no decline in value after the fire.3 In this
situation, there should have been no abatement of the purchase price be-
cause the purchaser is getting a value equal to that for which he con-
tracted, and the vendor bore the risk of loss.3s
3
7 1f the property had increased in value due to the fire, this benefit should
accrue to the purchaser.
38 The trial court, proceeding under the doctrine of equitable conversion, made
no findings of fact as to the values necessary to measure the abatement, and the
case should have been remanded for a hearing on these issues. See instant case
at 597 (dissenting opinion).
